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E. CONCLUSION
Mowlem, it is submitted, was wrongly decided. Not only was the decision unjust to the 
pursuer, but it also sends an erroneous, and even dangerous, message to the broader 
community. It states that contractors sued for certain defects in their work may reduce 
their liability to bear the cost of the remedial work if they can establish that the same 
work was required by other defects caused by them which the employer could have 
noticed more than fi ve years before the action commenced32 or which were built in 
more than twenty years before the action commenced.33 Indeed, the implications may 
reach far beyond the construction industry. For instance, a surgeon sued for certain 
errors in performing an operation may argue that the ensuing health problems would 
have independently resulted from further errors by him of which the patient could 
have become aware of more than three years before the action commenced.34 The 
(perceived) victim of a delict or breach of contract, however minor, would accord-
ingly be forced to bring an action if only to preserve the right to get full compensation 
for other wrongs not yet committed or known to be committed. All these develop-




The author is grateful for helpful comments from his colleagues Greg Gordon and Professor 
Roderick Paisley.
32 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 ss 6, 11(3).
33 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 7.
34 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s 17.
1 [2006] CSOH 58; 2006 SLT 591.
Options to Purchase and Successor Landlords
A. INTRODUCTION
The recent Outer House decision in The Advice Centre for Mortgages Ltd v McNicoll1 
provides sharp focus on an issue of both commercial and theoretical importance: does 
an option to purchase in favour of a tenant bind a purchaser of the premises? Two 
legal doctrines are of particular relevance here. The fi rst is whether the term is inter 
naturalia of the lease. The second is the so-called “offside goals” rule.
The case concerned an Edinburgh shop. The defender had become its owner in 
March 2004. The pursuers argued that they (a) were tenants of the shop and (b) had 
an option to purchase it. Their problem, however, was that they did not have a formal 
lease. They sought to rely on unconcluded missives between their solicitors and the 
agents for the defender’s predecessor as owner, and an unexecuted lease, which they 
averred they had agreed with that predecessor. Furthermore, they argued that a valid 
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lease had been constituted by personal bar. Their arguments here, which were unsuc-
cessful, are discussed by Elspeth Reid in her note2 and no more will be said about 
them. Rather, the focus will be on the enforceability of the option to purchase in the 
missives and draft lease. The defender’s position was that even if the court had held 
that a lease was established by personal bar, the option would not be enforceable 
against her as a successor landlord.
B. THE INTER NATURALIA ISSUE
Lease law is seriously under-researched in Scotland, and there is much work needing 
to be done on important questions. One of these is the circumstances in which terms 
in a lease transmit to successors of the original landlord and tenant. The rule here is 
that they do if they are inter naturalia of the lease. “This appears to mean”, notes a 
leading textbook,3 “that in order to bind a singular successor the condition must be 
one commonly occurring in the type of lease concerned.” For example, patently the 
tenant’s obligation to occupy the property and pay the rent will fall into the inter 
naturalia category. As a general statement, however, each clause must be considered 
individually. The result may not be coherent. In Optical Express (Gyle) Ltd v Marks 
& Spencer plc4 it was held in the Outer House that an exclusivity clause providing that 
the tenants were to be the only opticians in the Gyle Centre in Edinburgh was not 
enforceable against a successor landlord. As Angus McAllister has noted,5 the earlier 
Inner House case of Davie v Stark,6 in which a similar clause was duly enforced in 
such circumstances, was not cited to the court. This is because the inter naturalia 
point was not specifi cally argued there; thus one does not fi nd the case discussed in 
texts on the subject.7 In contrast, in the recent case of Warren James (Jewellers) Ltd 
v Overgate GP Ltd8 it was accepted without argument that an exclusivity clause did 
transmit.
There is a more fundamental question. Is the test properly whether the condition is 
a commonly occurring one?9 In the Optical Express case Lord Macfadyen commented 
that the matter is “primarily a question of the nature of the obligation”.10 This view 
mirrors the position in South Africa, where transmission of a term depends on an 
objective test of whether it is “material” or “collateral” to the lease.11 It might also be 
asked whether the intention of the parties is relevant. For example, the test for the 
2 See 437 below.
3 G C H Paton and J G S Cameron, The Law of Landlord and Tenant in Scotland (1967) 95.
4 2000 SLT 644.
5 A McAllister, Scottish Law of Leases, 3rd edn (2002) para 2.35.
6 (1876) 3 R 1114.
7 For example, Paton and Cameron, Lands and Tenant 94-97. Cf J Rankine, The Law of Leases in Scot-
land, 3rd edn (1916) 475-479 and 220.
8 [2005] CSOH 142.
9 I am indebted to Mr Peter Webster for sight of his research in this area and his comments on a draft of 
this article.
10 2000 SLT 644 at 650.
11 P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar and H Mostert, Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property, 4th edn 
(2003) 407.
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creation of real burdens is whether the parties to the deed have sought to create such 
an obligation, as evidenced by adhering to the correct rules on constitution.12 Real 
burdens, however, are limited by the rule requiring praedial benefi t13 and one can 
argue cogently on that basis that intention should be incapable of making a collateral 
term material. Here, however, is not the place to reformulate the Scots law, although, 
there is no doubt that the parameters of the inter naturalia doctrine are of great 
concern in commercial practice. 
For present purposes the issue is solely whether an option to purchase will bind a 
successor landlord. The leading authority here is Bisset v Magistrates of Aberdeen.14 
There, a 999 year lease contained an obligation on the landlords to deliver a feu charter 
to the tenants on request. It was held that the clause did not bind the landlords’ 
successors. In the words of Lord Moncreiff:15 
It is an obligation to alter the tenure from one of lease to one of feu. This can scarcely be said 
to be inter naturalia of a lease, and if it is not it will not affect singular successors. 
This passage was quoted approvingly by Lord Drummond Young, the judge in Advice 
Centre for Mortgages, who concluded that the option in the offer of lease was not 
binding on the defender.16 
The decision in Bisset leaves open the possibility of an option to purchase being 
regarded as inter naturalia if this can be shown as “customary and usual”17 for the type 
of lease in question. The pursuers in Advice Centre for Mortgages, however, made no 
averments to this effect.18 Rather their counsel merely submitted that such options 
were common and that this fact could be within judicial knowledge. Lord Drummond 
Young rightly dismissed this argument, commenting that:19 
while options to purchase are encountered, many leases do not contain such options. Indeed, 
in leases granted by investment institutions, which are very common, it is diffi cult to imagine 
why an option to purchase should be common practice. 
A party trying to show that such an option is, on the facts, inter naturalia of a lease is 
likely to face a diffi cult task.20 
12 See now in particular the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 ss 1-5.
13 2003 Act s 3(1)-(4).
14 (1898) 1 F 87.
15 At 90.
16 [2006] CSOH 58 at para 38.
17 Bisset (1898) 1 F 87 at 90 per Lord Moncreiff. In South Africa, it has been argued that an option will 
bind a successor landlord if it can be shown to be an integral part of the lease: see A J Kerr, The Law of 
Sale and Lease, 3rd edn (2004) 441-442. Where the land is transferred for no consideration, the successor 
is always bound: Van der Pol v Symington 1971 (4) SA 472. This may be because he or she is considered 
to be equivalent to an acquirer with knowledge of the option, a matter discussed below.
18 [2006] CSOH 58 at paras 37 and 39.
19 Para 40.
20 As has been commented, “it is almost certainly not”: K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2004 
(2005) 106.
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C. THE RELEVANCE OF BAD FAITH
A separate argument of the pursuers was that because the defender knew about the 
option when she acquired the property, she could therefore be regarded as in bad 
faith. Accordingly, she was bound by the option. In other words, she was bound to sell 
the property to the pursuers if they sought to exercise the option. 
In principle, it is diffi cult to see why a party can be bound by an obligation under-
taken by another merely because he or she has knowledge of it. The basis, however, 
of the pursuers’ argument was the so-called “offside goals” rule. The classic example 
is the double sale: where A agrees to sell property to B but then transfers it to C, 
B can reduce the conveyance to C if C can be shown to have been in bad faith (i.e. 
aware of the earlier agreement with B).21 The doctrine, however, is wider than that. It 
will apply, for example, if, rather than ownership being transferred to C, he or she is 
granted a standard security by A. B will be able to set that security aside on the basis 
of C’s bad faith.22
The doctrine was fi rst subjected to a sustained analysis by Professor Kenneth Reid 
in the 1990s.23 The last few years have seen much scholarship being devoted to a most 
interesting but, in terms of conceptual foundation, elusive subject.24 It seems to be 
generally accepted that a prerequisite for the offside goals rule to apply is that the 
grant of a right to C must breach a prior obligation between A and B. Thus in the case 
of a double sale, A breaches his obligation to transfer a good title to B by conveying 
to C. To paraphrase Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, there is an attempt to cut out B.25 
The problem for the pursuers in this case was the absence of a breach or attempt to 
cut out. The defender acquired ownership of the property. But nothing, express or 
implied, in the missives between the transferor and the pursuers or in the unsigned 
lease prevented transfer. In the words of Lord Drummond Young: “what matters is 
that the intervention of equity on the ground of bad faith is only warranted by the 
breaching of an existing obligation.”26 He continued, after reference to the work of 
Professor Reid:27
The sale of property … to the defender did not involve the seller in any breach of its existing 
obligations. No such breach is averred and it is diffi cult to see how any breach could be 
averred. The right to sell is one of the most normal incidents of property, and in my opinion 
clear wording or a clear implication would be required to restrict or remove that right.
21 The leading case is of course Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483.
22 Trade Development Bank v Crittall Windows Ltd 1983 SLT 510. 
23 K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) paras 695-700.
24 J Blackie, “Good faith and the doctrine of personal bar”, in A D M Forte (ed), Good Faith in Contract 
and Property Law (1999) 129 at 147-150; D L Carey Miller, “Good faith in Scots property law”, in Forte 
(ed), Good Faith in Contract and Property Law 103 at 107-110; S Wortley, “Double sales and the offside 
trap: some thoughts on the rule penalising private knowledge of a prior right” 2002 JR 291; D A Brand, 
A J M Steven and S Wortley, Professor McDonald’s Conveyancing Manual, 7th edn (2004) paras 32.52-
32.62; R G Anderson, “‘Offside goals’ before Rodger Builders” 2005 JR 277; D L Carey Miller with D 
Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) paras 8.31-8.32; D L Carey Miller, “Mala fi de 
transferees in Scotland: the case of a registered ‘offside goal’” (2005) 16 Stellenbosch LRev 318. 
25 Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19 at 39.
26 [2006] CSOH 58 at para 46.
27 Para 47.
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In his judgment, Lord Drummond Young had to deal with the one authority which 
supported the view that the defender was bound, Davidson v Zani.28 There, missives 
entered into in relation to a lease of shop premises in Aberdeen gave the tenant an 
option to purchase at the end of the lease. Prior to that date the shop was sold to a 
third party, who was aware of the option. The Sheriff Principal held that the facts fell 
within the scope of the offside goals rule and that the acquirer’s knowledge meant 
that she was bound by the option. Bisset was cited to him, but he held that it was not 
relevant to the matter at hand, as it was about the construction of a lease. In Davidson 
the obligation was in the missives between the parties, not the actual lease.
Lord Drummond Young concluded that Davidson was incorrectly decided.29 The 
sale of the shop was not in breach of the missives. Moreover, the Sheriff Principal did 
not give Bisset its “proper signifi cance”.30 If an option to purchase is not inter naturalia 
of the lease, it cannot bind successor landlords, whether they have knowledge of it 
or not. As noted, in Davidson the option was not even in the lease.31 Now, of course, 
the effect of the offside goals rule is to make a personal right binding on a third party 
because of their knowledge, in contrast to the general rule of property law that only 
real rights bind third parties. Why does that rule not apply here? The answer, it is 
submitted, is that the primary obligation on third parties arising under the rule is 
a negative one, i.e. not to breach the prior existing right.32 Making the option bind 
the acquirer would be to place a positive obligation on him, i.e. to sell the property, 
in a situation where there is no breach. The result is to override the inter naturalia 
doctrine. That must be wrong.33 To put it another way, the option is binding upon the 
initial landlord and no-one else. The offside goals rule should not alter that result.
The offside goals rule may be inapplicable here for a further reason, namely that 
the option does not confer a right upon a tenant, but a power which he or she can 
exercise, and until the power is exercised there is no right which is capable of being 
breached. Lord Drummond Young noted that the right/power “distinction does not 
appear to have been taken in any of the cases”.34 This question must be left for the 
future. 
Lord Drummond Young’s opinion is a helpful statement of the application of the 
offside goals rule to options in leases. Nevertheless, in this very diffi cult area, it is 
28 1992 SCLR 1001.
29 Para 51. The same conclusion is reached by K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2004 (2005) 
106.
30 Para 51.
31 This is rather similar to Optical Express (Gyle) Ltd v Marks and Spencer plc 2000 SLT 644 where an 
exclusivity clause which the tenants unsuccessfully argued was binding on new landlords as well as on 
other tenants by virtue of the “offside goals” rule was in a back letter and not the lease. See A J M Steven, 
“Keeping the goalposts in sight” 2000 SLT (News) 143.
32 Of course there may be a subsidiary positive obligation: for example, in the double sale, C may be 
required to convey to B. See Reid, Property (n 23) para 700. 
33 See also S Brymer, “Enforcing commercial lease terms against successor landlords” (2000) 49 Greens 
Property Law Bulletin 4, which was cited by Lord Drummond Young in para 51 of his judgment. A 
different view has been expressed in South Africa, but this seems diffi cult to reconcile with the fact 
that its equivalent of the offside goals rule requires infringement of a prior obligation: see Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert, Law of Property (n 11) 91 and 407. 
34 [2006] CSOH 58 at para 51. 
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possible to advance alternative arguments.35 In particular it can be suggested that by 
selling the property the original landlord makes it impossible to fulfi l his or her obliga-
tion under the option. The sale can therefore be analysed as an anticipatory breach 
of that obligation. That argument depends on how the option itself is analysed. It can 
be regarded as enforceable only so long as the original landlord remains owner and 
therefore automatically extinguished upon the transfer of the property. The alternative 
view, which accords with a general principle advanced by Gloag,36 is that the original 
landlord remains bound and will therefore be liable for breach of contract when he or 
she cannot perform. If that second view is correct, however, the obvious issue is what 
the original landlord can do so as not to be in breach. The matter should be dealt with 
expressly in the lease. Assuming, however, it is not, then one answer is that to avoid 
breach the original landlord must refrain from transferring. This seems unacceptably 
restrictive. A second answer is that there can be transfer but the successor landlord 
must be made to agree that the option is binding upon him or her. The effect, however, 
would be to undermine the inter naturalia doctrine. For that reason, the present 
writer prefers the view that the option is only binding upon the original landlord so 
long as he or she is owner. 
Andrew J M Steven
University of Edinburgh 
35 See in this regard the discussion of the position in England in S Tromans, “Options: as safe as houses?” 
(1984) 43 CLJ 55. 
36 W M Gloag, Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 264.
1 Josh Billings.
2 [2006] CSOH 58; 2006 SLT 591.
Personal Bar: Three Cases
One-half the troubles of this life can be traced to saying yes too quickly and not saying 
no soon enough.1
The “trouble” which Scots law commonly throws in the way of the rash and the hesitant 
is of course a plea of personal bar. The three cases considered below come from 
different conveyancing contexts, but for all, in one way or another, the “trouble” came 
from “not saying no soon enough”. But as so often, the plea of bar ended in failure. 
A. STATUTORY BAR AND LEASES
The fi rst case involved the statutory form of personal bar as set out in section 1(3) and 
(4) of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. In the decade since these 
provisions were enacted surprisingly little litigation has occurred. The Advice Centre 
for Mortgages v McNicoll2 is the fi rst case to offer extended analysis in relation to leases. 
The pursuers sought a declarator that they were tenants of a shop property, basing 
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